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In November 2016 both European Trade Commissioner Malmström and German 
Chancellor Merkel declared Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations 
– ongoing since 2013 – frozen, while simultaneously expressing a desire to salvage what had
been accomplished in a (potential) future revival.1 The negotiations were stumbling far prior to 
the election of Donald Trump as American president. Though his victory heralded major changes 
to US trade policy, including its withdrawal from the Transpacific Partnership Agreement, he 
expressed few opinions about TTIP during the campaign. So why could the US and the European 
Union (EU) not conclude a treaty? 
Free trade traditionally enjoys support throughout Europe, especially in the northern half, 
and EU trade negotiations (perceived as technical and remote) have rarely evoked public 
interest.2 At the same time, many trade agreements often face resistance from select groups and 
specific portions of the general population who believe they may experience immediate and 
focused costs, notwithstanding potential – but diffused – long-term benefits to the overall 
economy.3 In regards to TTIP, deep transatlantic economic interpenetration and interdependence 
means most sectors on both sides of the Atlantic would be affected, with macro-economic gains 
projected for both sides, even if certain sectors would benefit more.4 The negotiations were also 
presented by the EU and the US leadership as a joint transatlantic effort aimed at addressing 
stagnant growth and unemployment, while also setting global standards at a time of rising 




However, the focus of the debate quickly changed away from the agreement’s economic 
and rule-setting potential as an organized opposition emerged, concentrated in Europe. 6 The 
projected benefits to the European and American economies were questioned, and the potential 
costs associated with an agreement were increasingly deemed extraordinarily high by European 
consumer, welfare, and environmental organizations, as well as more radical and populist anti-
globalization and anti-capitalist groups, and labor unions (all here collectively referred to as civil 
society organizations, CSOs).7 The advantages enjoyed by business groups favoring free trade 
(e.g. TABC, BusinessEurope), such as access to the Commission and national governments, 
were overshadowed by CSOs and unions. These groups mounted an extraordinary and 
ubiquitous campaign, moving public opinion against TTIP.8  Opponents challenged the 
Commission, US Government, and other proponents’ claims of prospective economic gains, job 
creation, and higher safety and regulatory standards. Opposition mobilization occurred through 
social media and traditional street protests, while also garnering increased attention from 
mainstream media; the latter being important in order to capture the attention of policy makers 
and sustain campaigns.9 The Commission, national governments, and most business 
organizations were unprepared for the unprecedented and coordinated onslaught through social 
media, physical protests in rallies and marches, and targeted lobbying of legislators.10 
TTIP had been predicted difficult to conclude, and the protectionist rhetoric dominating 
the 2016 US presidential election campaign certainly did not help, but European developments 
are largely responsible for the freezing of negotiations.11 Opponents’ actions have led EU 
negotiators to alter their approach in ways seen implausible only a few years ago; in other words, 
affecting agenda setting, the procedure (how), and policy (what). The promise of ‘continued 




an acknowledgement that CSOs’ ‘push’ and ‘opposition’ and altered public sentiments have 
affected how they reviewed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and how they decided to 
go forward with the messaging.’12 A representative of a transatlantic business organization 
acknowledged in 2015, 
[t]hey [industry] realize now that civil society groups now have an advantage in the 
marketing of TTIP and TTIP issues, and that businesses have difficulties in getting across 
their concerns and issues and difficulty conveying the truth and countering 
misperceptions distributed by public interest groups. There are intense discussions now 
on how to counter misperceptions and promote TTIP.13 
 
This paper identifies and explains how pan-European and national organizations 
organized opposition to TTIP; why certain key issues were strategically chosen, and how certain 
words and phrases were utilized to raise public salience and mobilize opposition.14 The increased 
salience of issues in TTIP in the eyes of ordinary Europeans then contributed to changing public 
opinion, as well as increasingly effective fund raising for participating CSOs. This in turn 
allowed opposition groups to significantly increase their staff with both sympathetic issue 
specialists and campaign strategists. European opposition groups’ dominance of the public 
debate correlate with declining European public support for TTIP, rendering an agreement highly 
doubtful. These insights contribute to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic 
relations. More specifically, this paper discusses how a campaign targeting key issues while 
appealing to generalized and diffused interests and public opinion impact a specific area of 
public policy (trade).15 The next section shows how the literature on framing and public 
perception can explain the anti-TTIP strategy and campaign. We thereafter look at the impact on 





Anti-TTIP group mobilization and issue choices 
 
Notwithstanding attempts to present the anti-TTIP opposition as ‘grass-roots’, the campaign 
against TTIP has been a highly professionalized, top-down, trans-European campaign.16 The 
initial suspicion toward TTIP came largely from mainstream CSOs (e.g. BEUC, Public Citizen, 
Friends of the Earth Europe), whose concerns focused on the perceived threat to EU safety and 
food standards (which they argued were higher than America’s) emanating from the much touted 
regulatory focus in TTIP. The argument was that both mutual recognition and recognition of 
equivalency of each other’s standards create a ‘race to the bottom’ on standards in order to attract 
investments.17 These groups produced campaign material independently, but also worked with 
other groups under an umbrella organization called StopTTIP, which boasted of over 200 
participating organizations. But why were certain strategies and issues chosen? How have they 
succeeded? 
Politics is about perceptions, and for agreements requiring European Parliamentary and 
domestic legislative ratification constituency perceptions matter. Dür (2015: 7, 25) finds that 
interest groups can shape public opinion in line with their preferences via frames, meaning a 
particular emphasis on and interpretation of an event (e.g. ‘this arbitration case shows how 
corporations circumvent democracy’), while cues, information used to infer other information 
the recipient does not possess (e.g. the Greens oppose ISDS, therefore I should oppose ISDS), 
matter less in shaping opinion.18 Thus, while CSOs still use ‘inside’ tactics (e.g. letters to 
officials and personal meetings), ‘outside’ tactics (e.g. demonstrations and petitions),19 social 
media, postings and creative propaganda websites, they may be more effective in disseminating 




enjoy higher public trust than the EU, national governments, or corporations, placing them in a 
better position to shape public opinion via frames.20 
 
Receptivity to frames is facilitated by how they are designed. Humans are more receptive 
to fear than positive messaging; later-in-time information remains more relevant than earlier 
information, and negatives (e.g. economic pain) are perceived more strongly than benefits.21 
Hence, opponents’ messaging is expected to have a higher impact the more fear it is able to 
convey to the population and the more continuous the messaging. Another key characteristic of 
good framing is its link with existing beliefs. Perceptions do not necessarily rest on logical and 
sound premises; in fact, they may contain only a kernel of truth in order to gain traction.22 
Human preferences for consistency and simplicity means there is a tendency to accept 
information conforming to one’s expectations, and to interpret evidence, whatever its nature and 
strength, as validating existing beliefs.23 To prevent cognitive dissonance people also erect filters 
that stop information perceived to be inconsistent with or contradictory to one’s expectations 
(which are based on preconceived notions and worldviews).24 The result is acceptance of both 
information and propaganda, but with difficulty distinguishing between the two, and increased 
likelihood of accepting and disseminating distortions of reality – such as stories with omitted or 
misrepresented facts – to other audiences, creating myths.25  
Political actors, including interest groups and unions, can achieve the desired reaction in 
the public by choosing specific issues to simplify and emphasize. Such campaigns may include 
appealing to product or process associations to elicit a response. Thus, if chemicals (A) are 
associated with poison (B), associating a different product or issue (C) with A can elicit a 




other groups also tend to mobilize for the cause (while simultaneously seeking to gain attention, 
membership, and funds, all of which increase mobilization resources) creating a snowball or 
avalanche effect.26 By ‘making a fuss’ about the chosen issues and processes groups are also 
more likely to receive news coverage of their message (which increases the likelihood of the 
desired effect).27 In sum, fear-filled information, especially when building on general and 
negative perceptions, gets public attention, so choosing the ‘correct’ issue(s) is essential.  
 
Opposition CSOs needed specific words and phrases to educate and rally citizens. 
Ordinary citizens cannot be expected to engage on obscure issues and opaque trade negotiations, 
so, as one CSO representative confided, we ‘needed something to raise fears and capture 
attention.’ No organization provided more ammunition to anti-TTIP groups than Campact. 
Founded in Aachen, Germany, from which Attac (an experienced organization opposing 
globalization, capitalism, and TTIP) also stems. Campact first emerged as active on policy when 
campaigning for green labelling on products, at which time it gathered 800,000 email addresses. 
This list rose to nearly two million by 2016. The organization promotes and engages on ideas 
provided by other groups and individuals, but most importantly serves as a source of pivotal data 
and support. Campact provides material, raises money through town hall events and online 
donations, disperses money to groups and campaigns, but does not serve as the primary organizer 
of anti-TTIP protests.28 Its tactics work effectively as force multipliers. Campact conducts 
market tests on policies requested by the client by using phrases and words on the topic or issue. 
It takes a name or process, ties it to a policy, and sends a query to targeted e-mails drawn from its 
list-serve. Building on the responses the message is modified, and the product, action, or process 




democracy) before being retested. The client is then provided the results, or campaign ‘fuel’ (e.g. 
which words, phrases, or associations evoked certain desired reactions). The phrases and words 
shown to resonate with citizens are used not only in campaigns, but also when seeking funding 
from donors for specific activities, another Campact specialty.29 Their ‘infrastructure for political 
education’ includes donations (over €140,000) to groups across several EU Member States; 
much of the money is raised through small online and town hall donations.30 
Specific issues such as food and investor rights were chosen not primarily because they 
represent issues on which groups would have the best chances of influencing policy proposals, 
but rather because they help raise the salience of TTIP generally, which in turn allows lobbying, 
protests, and campaigns also on technical details and other specifics.31 The American process of 
chlorinated microbial wash of poultry was a natural choice of focus as it connected an appealing 
food (chicken) with chemicals (chlorine).32 For most Europeans the significance of food extends 
far beyond its nutritional value; it is an essential part of life, where caution prevails and 
discussions of recognizing others’ standards raise concerns.33 Sixty percent of European check 
the origin of their food, and for nearly half the origin influences their purchase.34 This is higher 
than for any other category of products, indicating awareness of and concern with food, and 
likely higher receptivity to public campaigns regarding issues related to food. Furthermore, the 
precautionary principle guides EU food policy, and groups have successfully appealed to 
Europeans’ relationship with food.  
‘It is not without reason that chlorinated chicken has emerged as a symbol of the 
detriments European consumers might face if a TTIP deal is signed… [t]he European 




American approach is ‘[t]he “easy fix” to make up for poor farming and slaughter 
hygiene.’35  
The prevailing norm of objection to GMOs is also deeply entrenched as only 21% believe they 
are safe.36 While Europeans widely support science and technology as the bases for policy and 
progress, the exception is food, where less than half believe science can improve food quality.37 
This was manifest when the EU’s chief science adviser publicly and repeatedly urged more 
evidence-based decisions, only to be forced out following political outcry over her views.38   
CSOs present American standards as ‘weak’ and ‘less safe,’ as reflected in position 
papers, social media posts, online videos, protests, and public statements, and key European 
publics have increasingly agreed.39 Foodwatch, an anti-corporation group founded in 2001 and 
involved in raising awareness on issues such as mad cow disease, chemicals, and GMOs, entered 
the TTIP fray in 2014. Thilo Bode – the charismatic leader whose 2015 book Die 
Freihandelslüge was a best-seller in Germany – effectively used selective trigger words and 
provocative framing in public speeches and debates in order to win of over public support 
against TTIP, the provisions of which he asserts ‘serve big business instead of ordinary people, 
and they undermine our democratic standards.’40 Raising public salience on food was thus 
primarily an issue of presenting the specifics of sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) as a 
threat to Europeans’ health in a simplified and understandable fashion. 
ISDS was quickly deemed a useful target which could be drastically simplified to the 
general public in order to garner attention and raise awareness of TTIP. The dispute settlement 
system is intended to ensure that foreign investors have access to de-politicized legal redress for 
compensation (not legislative changes) when a host country’s government violates the terms of 




Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs) – which began in Europe after WWII as investors 
wanted assurances when investing in former colonies (EU states have signed 1,400 BITs, many 
with ISDS, compared with fewer than 50 BITs signed by the US) – it was unknown to the 
general public (as well as many CSOs, labor unions, and policy makers) prior to 2013.42 Yet 
‘Allowing corporations to sue governments in secret courts over policies they don’t like’ and 
‘threatening public services’  tested well, and became mantras continuously repeated in protests 
and panel discussions, in YouTube videos, tweets, position papers, reports, and press releases. 
The anti-TTIP campaign was a great boom for ‘campaign companies’ such as 38 
Degrees, Campact, and Attac, for whose ‘business models, TTIP provides an ideal breeding 
ground to increase brand awareness and funding, respectively.’43 Campact doubled the number 
of employees, to a professional staff of three dozen people and a budget of 6 million euros, or 
about $6.8 million, annually.44  Similarly, other opposition groups also enjoyed rising donations 
(in addition to the grants many receive from the EU), and hired trade specialists from 
government and academia, adding additional in-house expertise while boosting the credibility of 
their cause.45 Legal experts toiling in obscurity on ISDS (some of whom had been told when 
submitting academic papers that ‘this is not important’) were suddenly coveted as the concept of 
investors suing governments using secret arbitration panels tested well. The extensive 
penetration of trade specialists (including academics) in opposition groups provided an aura of 
professionalism and seriousness to the campaign. These groups were many aspects as well-
organized as the business organizations and lobbyists they criticize. 
 





The combination of professional testing, mass mobilization, tech-savvy employees, and 
proliferation of mobile, easy-to-use social media meant that the years 2014-2016 saw an 
effective, highly asymmetrical, anti-TTIP propaganda apparatus.46 TV remained the most 
popular source of information across the EU in 2016, while newspapers retained a significant 
share among those 55 and older, thus making traditional media attention crucial for opposition 
groups seeking to raise salience and attract supporters. However, six out of ten EU citizens, and 
half of young people (<35), as well as those with a college degree, get news from the web, 
including social media sources (of which Facebook, Youtube and twitter are the most popular).47 
This helps to (partly) explain both the anti-TTIP campaign’s focus on social media (‘that’s where 
people are’), and the campaign’s success, as cleverly constructed information (read: propaganda) 
and advertisements frame people’s perceptions of TTIP. The European Commission instructed 
its staff and member states on the need for ‘strong political communication’ in order to ‘define 
the terms of debate’ on TTIP,48 not unlike the way the US Administration and USTR attempted 
to set the terms of debate on TPP, but with little success.  
In the fall of 2013 CSOs and unions staged protests and published policy papers opposing 
ISDS. The opposition was so intense that in January 2014 a negotiating pause on the issue was 
announced, during which the public would be consulted. In July 2014, led by StopTTIP!, the 
Commission was presented with a European Citizens Initiative with more than one-million 
European signatures petitioning it to alter negotiations (remove ISDS) and hold hearings in 
Parliament.49 While dismissed (petitioners were informed that the petition process is inapplicable 
to preparatory decisions), it succeeded in generating further outcry from citizen groups, while 
generating media coverage across Europe. In an online world, participation in petitions serve as a 




TTIP message to larger audiences. Throughout the year think tanks, academics, and law centers 
also issued policy papers, commentaries on past and ongoing arbitrations, and held panel 
debates.50 By mid-2015 the Citizens Initiative has gathered two million signatures, while the US 
Congress in turn debated trade promotion authority legislation requiring ISDS in trade 
agreements, providing additional fuel for European opponents.51 
Following the January 2015 press release of the results of the public consultation, the 
Commission promised months of stakeholder dialogue and possible refinements to ISDS. This 
was met with indignation from CSOs.52 Opposition CSOs had collectively amassed 150,000 
signatures against ISDS, predominantly by getting citizens to contribute pre-formatted 
submissions against ISDS (96% came from Austria, Germany, the UK, France, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Spain). Notwithstanding the tactics, the fact that 97% of submissions were in 
opposition to ISDS in TTIP was widely publicized and used by CSOs, putting pressure on the 
Commission to act on the issue.  In September 2015 the Commission responded -with a revised 
ISDS, in the form of extensive curtailments on how, when, and where investors could challenge 
government decisions as well as a permanent Investor Court System (ICS). This succeeded in 
generating both derision and protest from CSOs, as well as opposition from nearly every other 
interested party.53 US officials and transatlantic business groups deemed the proposal too 
restrictive, while also noting the near-certain Congressional rejection of a new international 
court.54  
Opposition CSOs made effective use of selective data, simplifications, exaggerations, and 
distortions, especially in social media disseminations, while simultaneously attracting attention 
from the traditional media. While thousands of events were held across Europe in 2014-2016 by 




active on the continent. In Germany ‘Well over 75% of TTIP events have been organized by 
opponents, and by one estimate 42 of the fifty most requested and cited experts (read: people to 
comment on TTIP) in 2015 were against TTIP.’55 Horrific images and ideologically grounded, 
creative and manipulative slogans such as ‘TTIP kills,’, ‘Stop (t) TTIP,’ ‘TTIP is an attack on 
our democracy,’ and ‘Tango against TTIP’ dominated the discourse, as the negative connotations 
intended to activate resistance.56 CSOs mustered an estimated 250,000 protesters into the streets 
of Berlin on October 10, 2015. Meanwhile, Germany’s economy minister published a full-page 
letter in several major newspapers on the day of the protest to urge against scaremongering. As 
one scholar noted,  
Unfortunately, anti-TTIP groups keep on spreading speculations and risks that are 
completely irrelevant and frequently taken out of the blue…Due to Campact’s efforts, we 
have arrived at a stage where German citizens’ interest in TTIP is 25 times higher than in 
the US and roughly 15 times higher than in France. The sad thing is, however, that most 
citizens are simply misinformed, e.g. by paid-for Google advertisements set up by anti-
TTIP groups.57 
Publicity surrounding the fall 2015 release of the EU’s ICS to replace ISDS also 
generated increased online searches on the issue. Internet search frequency is one reflection of an 
issue’s salience, and while there were no discernable volumes prior to June 2013, the following 
year saw Germany register the most TTIP web searches, followed by Austria and Belgium, the 
three countries with the largest anti-TTIP movements and most CSO activity.58 Bauer (2015) 
found that  
85 per cent of all TTIP-related positions in German online media are originally authored 
and spread by anti-TTIP groups. Similarly, for the period July-December 2014, anti-TTIP 
groups’ announcements in Germany amounted to 83 per cent of total online media 
reporting on average, going up to 93 per cent in peak times. …around the TTIP 
negotiations rounds, and it is obvious that there are coordinated multi-online-media 





Online TTIP searches in each of the three EU Member States with the largest anti-TTIP 
movements (Germany, Belgium, Austria), and in three of the most populous Member States 
(France, United Kingdom and Italy) between January 2013 and February 2017 showed similar 
trends.59 Searches peaked around the negotiating rounds and CSO-led street protests in early and 
late 2014, January and October 2015, April 2016, and September–October 2016, when the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) figured prominently in the 
European press, and was frequently linked to TTIP. Trade was also hotly debated in the US 
election (worrying some Europeans), and the last TTIP negotiating round of 2016 took place in 
New York.  
REFERNCE TO ONLINE SUPPLEMENTAL GRAPH 1 SOMEWHERE HERE 
YouTube searches on TTIP also peaked around the same dates as web searches, and in 
regards to the content found on YouTube the results were similar to those of a google search.60 
When googling TTIP in Germany one was first exposed to paid advertisements from opposition 
groups (e.g. Foodwatch), followed by a news headline, and thereafter several more anti-TTIP 
links.61 ‘TTIP kills,’ ‘Stop TTIP’ and similar slogans thus dominate the information Germans get 
when using the internet to find information on TTIP, creating and reinforcing negative 
perceptions. Anecdotally, our own December 2014 and May 2016 TTIP searches on Youtube 
yielded 16 and 19 of the 20 first results on Youtube being explicitly anti-TTIP. Furthermore, as 
Ciofu and Stefanatu (2016) show, ‘Tweets that include hashtag words generally favorable to the 
agreement only make up roughly 1% of total tweets, whereas tweets advocating a clear no 
(through hashtags like #stopttip, #nottip, #noalttip and others) represent 99% of total TTIP 




through exchanges (debate), where balanced views are not required, reinforcing negative 
messages. 
REFERNCE TO ONLINE SUPPLEMENTAL GRAPH 2 SOMEWHERE HERE 
The Google Trends for ISDS show, in general, a similar pattern to TTIP.62 Nevertheless, 
differences can be observed at country level, where ISDS was consistently of high interest in 
Germany while it tended to increase around negotiations, protests and intense campaign activism 
in other countries. 
Opposition to ISDS also worked its way into governments, with France and Germany 
expressing desires for a renegotiation of the ISDS clause in CETA before the Commission’s 
revised ICS, and support for similar text in TTIP.63 Opposition was also visible later, at the 
October 2016 near-fatal objections to the CETA text by the regional Belgian parliament in 
Wallonia.64 There was significant regional public opposition stemming from the anti-
TTIP/CETA campaign’s assertions of how allowing ICS could hurt public policy, and the 
opposition found great receptivity in Wallonia’s socialist prime minister. Following immense 
pressure from other EU leaders he agreed to sign only after the EU issued a ‘binding declaration 
on ICS’ and approved a referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union to rule on ICS 
compatibility with EU treaties.65  
Europe’s long, favorable and expansive history of trade agreements could be expected to 
mitigate at least some of the negative messaging of TTIP; even in the depth of the financial crisis 
(2010) 65% of Europeans said the EU benefitted from international trade, and general support 
for free trade stood at 69% in 2016.66 Yet, support for TTIP across the EU has fallen, and in 




the possibility or potentiality of having to accept GMOs, chlorinated chicken, companies suing 
governments, and privatization of public services.  
The opposition campaign’s focus on SPS (food safety issues) intensified in 2014. In a 
June 2014 open letter, which was either published or referenced by several news prominent 
European outlets, three leading civil society groups argued, 
…fair, sustainable and safe food could permanently be damaged by the transatlantic trade 
deal on the table….[T]he WTO SPS agreement has been disproportionately used by the 
US (on behalf of agribusiness) to challenge EU standards on a wide range of food safety 
measure.[W]e cannot have confidence that the draft measures designed to expedite 
agricultural and food trade between Europe and America will uphold to the highest 
standards the food safety safeguards that protect consumers and animals.67 
 
The anti-TTIP campaign tapped into this skepticism, frequently presenting American 
food as chemically enhanced and driven by large-scale industrial output, in a society that has no 
food culture.68  Appealing to the public about the possibility, however remote, of having to 
accept GMOs, chlorinated chicken and companies suing governments worked exceptionally 
well. The recipient notices the action or threat (chlorine chicken, sue governments) rather than 
the modal verbs signaling a remote possibility. Only 30% of Europeans expressed concerns 
about residues such as antibiotics or hormones in meat in 2010 – before any talk of a trade 
agreement – but in 2014 there was great resistance to accepting American standards or altering 
what is perceived as higher Europeans standards.69  
In the UK opposition groups deliberately played up the potentiality of privatizing the 
National Health Service (NHS) as a consequence of regulatory convergence and forced 
competition.70 Despite continuous government assurances to the contrary, the percentage of 
British respondents who believed the government could protect the NHS dropped twenty-four 




and more than half did not trust the government to negotiate a deal in Britain’s best interest.71 
One year later only 19% thought TTIP ‘was a good thing,’ even though 44% believed it would 
create British jobs; however, only one in six admitted following TTIP ‘closely.’72 
 
While the aspects of TTIP debated in most business and EU circles differ from those 
promoted on social networks, the goal for all participants is to influence public opinion to one’s 
advantage and, in this way, to exert pressure on policymakers. Opposition groups have been very 
good at this. With little public knowledge of ISDS, and an early focus on the issue, CSOs and 
unions could shape opinion by stressing the negative cases (where private companies had sued 
governments) and future danger with ISDS, in addition to the scaremongering on food issues. 
Online searches for TTIP or ISDS show a crushing majority conveying – often well-scripted –
negative messages; thus it was unsurprising that people began believing this story. The polls 
suggest the anti-TTIP campaign strategy worked. In an April 2014 Pew survey 55% of Germans 
thought TTIP was ‘a good thing’, and 88%  said the same thing about trade in general; five 
months later only 39% supported TTIP, falling to one-in-five  by May 2016. Austria exhibited a 
similar decline. In no country did support increase between November 2014 and May 2016. 
There is also no correlation between general support for trade and specific support for TTIP, 
another indication that anti-TTIP propaganda and protests have impacted public opinion, while 
supporters struggled to convey their message.73   
 
Graph on Public Opinion HERE  
 
Even the European Parliament, where pro-trade sentiments normally override ideological 




TTIP emails and constituency protests. In October 2012 the European Parliament voted 526-92 
for a resolution calling for the commencement of negotiations on a TTIP. Twenty-six months 
later the lead report by the Committee on International Trade was highly critical, and the June 
2015 resolution of continued support had to be postponed a month, with further revisions, when 
the Socialist group threatened to oppose the resolution because of internal divisions over ISDS.74  
Furthermore, the argument that because negotiations occur behind closed doors the participating 
parties must be hiding something conveniently omits that not only is this standard negotiating 
practice and necessary for frank discussions (which can lead to acceptable compromises), but 
every previous treaty was also negotiated in the same fashion, by the Commission based on a 
mandate from elected national governments 
.  
Conclusion 
This paper makes two contributions to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic 
relations. Together they indicate that transatlantic relations (deeper integration between the US 
and the EU) were being challenged even before Donald Trump became president, and that 
lobbying in trade may no longer be limited to narrowly focused interests, such that even a 
finalized TTIP agreement would face serious problems with ratification in many Member 
States.75  
The first contribution has to do with how key pan-European and national organizations 
are able to mobilize generalized and diffused interests and public opinion. Despite its novelty 
and relatively limited resources (compared to business organizations) the anti-TTIP campaign in 
Europe has been able to raise public salience and mobilize public opinion by choosing the 




ideas, values, and policy. It allows the dissemination of ideas irrespective of whether they are 
true, or even partially accurate, and social media enable disseminators to promulgate truths as 
well as unsubstantiated and/or unverified claims, while leaving the determination of what is true 
in the hands (minds) of the recipient. Alarmist, fear-filled messaging tends to be more impactful 
than facts, and when faced with conflicting opinions, those holding positive views tend to remain 
silent, allowing the more critical crowd to dominate the discussion.  
The second contribution has to do with how generalized and diffused interests and public 
opinion are impacting an area of public policy (trade) traditionally influenced largely by 
lobbying from narrowly focused interests. The timing of searches on Google and YouTube 
indicate that the public debate has been impacted by European opposition groups’ actions and 
that there is a correlation between these results and declining European public support for TTIP.   
 
 
                                                          
 
1 Brussels Briefing on Trade, November 12, at 
http://www.borderlex.eu/eutradeinsights/malmstrom-ttip-to-remain-in-a-freezer-for-quite-some-
time/ ; November 17, 2016 Trade News Analysis, 
https://twitter.com/TradeNewsCentre/status/799312181670055938 
2 Opposition campaigns and protests have been conspicuously absent from the EU-Japan 
negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA), which commenced six months prior to TTIP, and 
other negotiations, such as between the EU and Vietnam negotiations, which concluded in 2016. 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4 E.g. Gabriel Felbermayr et al. ’Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who 
benefits from a free trade deal?’ Global Economic Dynamics Paper, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
‘Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment – 
An Economic Assessment’, Final Report for the European Commission, Contract 
TRADE10/A2/A16, Center for Economic Policy Research, London (2013). It would be expected 
that participants in the highly 
it is in fact the only sector without transatlantic coordination in favor of TTIP. cf Alasdair Young, 
‘Not your parents' trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
negotiations’, Review of International Political Economy, Online March 28, DOI: 
10.1080/09692290.2016.1150316. European farmers (more heavily subsidized and representing 
more family farms than in the US) generally oppose TTIP, and its most sensitive products were 
never even seriously considered for complete tariff removal. Interviews Brussels, May 2016 and 
Washington DC, January 2017. 
5 Final Report High Level Working Groupon Jobs and Growth (February 11, 2013), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf 
6 This paper focuses on the European side of CSO activities. Though there has been plenty of 
transatlantic cooperation and coordination among TTIP opposition groups – with American 
CSOs advising their European peers on issues such as Investor-State Dispute Settlements 
(ISDS), co-authoring letters to legislators, and coordinating protests –American groups focused 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
stop TTIP, as revealed in author interviews with representatives in Washington DC, January 
2017. 
7 As applied here CSOs include what Berry 1999 in Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo Insiders 
versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2016) call citizen groups, or public interest groups, and are focused on animal welfare, 
consumer interests, public health and environmental causes, and international development. 
Labor unions spoke favorably of TTIP even before its formal launch, recognizing the favorable 
labor standards in the EU, and the  largest American labor union, AFL/CIO, privately expressed 
hopes that TTIP could help improve labor standards in the US (Interview, Washington DC, 
October 2012). 
8 Space limitations prevent a deep discussion but it is necessary to highlight that opponents to 
TTIP can largely be divided into two camps. The reformers would accept an agreement with the 
US if, in their view, there were substantial revisions to proposals, including enhanced guarantees 
on protecting human and plant health, higher safety standards, and curtailment of what they 
deem corporate power. Reformers include CSOs such as the European Consumer Organization 
(BEUC).  Labor unions, which have always been active on trade, are also reformists, though with 
more unacceptable ‘red lines’; they are seen as closer to the rejectionist camp (with groups such 
as Attac, Corporate Observatory, and War on Want, all part of the StopTTIP! Alliance, all with 
previous experience opposing globalization, capitalism and trade). This group opposes an 
agreement under any circumstance, premised on arguments that modern trade policies are the 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
two camps are joined in a cause and cooperate on protests, they differ slightly in their 
approaches.  Reformists tend to engage in insider lobbying, public debates with trade supporters, 
and peaceful street protests; they also use a less confrontational social media campaign than 
rejectionists. E.g.  Giovanni Gortanutti, ‘The influence of trade unions and social movements on 
EU trade policy.’ Paper presented at EU Trade Policy at the Crossroads: between Economic 
Liberalism and Democratic Challenges, Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für internationale 
Entwicklungspolitik, February 4-6, 2016. 
9 E.g. Anke Tresch and Manuel Fischer, ‘In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and 
Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western 
European Countries,’ International Political Science Review, 36(4), (2015):355-372; Jean-
Frederic Morin et al. The Politics of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations TTIP in a Globalized 
World. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015.   
10 Interview European Commission regular adviser, May 2016. 
11 On predictions see Leif Johan Eliasson, ‘Problems, progress, and prognosis in trade and 
investment negotiations:  the Transatlantic Free Trade and Investment Partnership’ Journal of 
Transatlantic Relations, 14, no 2, (2014):119-139. 
12 Interview, Brussels, May 2016. Though the Commission’s January 13, 2015 press release was 
strategically worded to balance recognition of opposition with a determination to find a 
compromise to ensure ISDS or ICS is included in a final agreement. 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14 The focus in this paper is the effects of the campaign, not the accuracy and validity of 
opponents’ arguments, which are separate issues addressed elsewhere, see Patrica Garcia-Duran 
and Leif Johan Eliasson, ‘The Public Debate over TTIP and its Underlying Assumptions’ 
Journal of World Trade 51, no. 1 (2017):23-42.   
15 Trade has traditionally, with few exceptions, been spared large-scale public mobilization and 
engagement, and instead been influenced mostly by insider lobbying from narrowly focused 
interests.  
16 cf. Matthias Bauer, ‘Pferd(e) und Reiter in den Protest-Kampagnen um TTIP in Deutschland 
und Europa,’ Policy Briefing Paper.  European Centre for International Political Economy (2016) 
http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2016/09/2016_09_01_Pferde-und-Reiter-in-den-Protest-
Kampagnen-um-TTIP-ECIPE-Policy-Brief_To_Go_rev-.pdf. 
In addition to references provided, this section is based on several interviews with participants 
and observers in Brussels, May 2016, and Berlin (via telephone), June, 2016. The opposition to 
TTIP (and subsequently CETA) is strictly speaking a combination of individual (pan-European 
and national) organizations conducting activities to stop the agreement, but the StopTTIP 
umbrella alliance unifies hundreds of smaller groups. Many protests across Europe have been 
coordinated, and the resulting dominance of social media, resulting in (crucially) changing public 
opinion, provide the public and many policy makers with the impression of a coordinated 
opposition. 
17 Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügges, TTIP: The Truth About the Transatlantic Trade and 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Future?  A threat to Europe’s democracy and environmental, health, and social safeguards’ 
Position paper on TTIP, October 2013, 
https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/foee_briefing_ttip_oct13.pd;  Bauer, 
2016, ‘Pferde…’; ‘Commentary by Thilo Bode: TTIP is not about blinkers’ Foodwatch, 
November 11 (2014), https://www.foodwatch.org/en/what-we-do/news/commentary-by-thilo-
bode-ttip-is-not-about-blinkers/?sword_list%5B0%5D=ttip; European Consumer Organization 
(BEUC), ‘Consumers at the heart of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.’ 
Position Paper, May 21, (2014), http://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2014-
031_mgo_ttip_updated.pdf. 
18 Andreas Dür, ‘Interest Group Influence on Public Opinion: A Survey Experiment on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement.’ Working Paper, April 25 (2015) 
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3981.9683 
19 cf. Anne Binderkrantz, ‘Different Groups, Different Strategies: How Interest 
Groups Pursue Their Political Ambitions,’ Scandinavian Political Studies 31, no. 2, (2008):173- 
200; Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo, ‘Public Opinion and Interest Group Influence: How 
Citizen Groups Derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,’ Journal of European Public 
Policy 21, no. 8 (2014):1206. 
20 Eurobarometer 80 (2013) ; Special Eurobarometer ‘Europeans 2014’ (2014); Flash 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
21 Elizabeth Kensinger, ‘What we remember (and forget) about positive and negative 
experiences,’ Psychological Science Agenda, October 2011, 
http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2011/10/positive-negative.aspx 
22 Brian Möller-Jensen, Myter, Myte or Realitet, Herning: Systime (1988): 6-8; Cyrill Buffet and 
Beatrice Heuser, Haunted by History Myths in International Relations. Oxford, New York: 
Berghahn Books (1998); Leif Johan Eliasson, America’s Perception of Europe, New York: 
Palgrave McMillan (2010) 
23 Raymond Nickerson, ‘Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,’ 
Review of General Psychology. 2, no.2 (1998):175-220. 
24 cf. Buffet and Heuser, 1998; Heather Lamarre et al. (2009), ‘The irony of satire: political 
ideology and the motivation to see what you want to see in The Colbert Report,’ International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 14, no. 2 (2009): 212-231. 
25 cf. Jarrod Call and Brent Berry, ‘The Dissemination of Knowledge and its Problems in 
American Democracy,’ Public Knowledge Journal (e-version) 2, no.1.3 (2011); 
Stephen Bennett, et al. ‘Citizens' Knowledge of Foreign Affairs,’ The Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics.1, no. 2 (1996):10-29; Buffet and Heuser, 1998; Möller-Jensen, 1998. 
26 Cf. Dür and Mateo 2014:1209. For more on salience, polarization (different beliefs and views), 
and actor expansion (different and greater number of groups involved) at different levels of 
engagement see e.g. Michael Zürn, ‘Opening up Europe: next steps in politicization research,’ 
West European Politics, 39, no.1, (2015):164-182, and the discussion in Niels Gheyle, 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
27 Lucig Danielian and Benjamin Page, ‘The heavenly chorus: interest group voices on TV news. 
American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994):1072. For a discussion of the origin of 
mobilization, as the dependent variable, see Niels Gheyle, ‘Adding fuel to the flames. How TTIP 
reinvigorated the politicization of trade,’ Paper presented at Governance and Integration through 
Free Trade Agreements, Brussels, July 7-8, 2016.   
28 Cf. Bauer, 2016, ‘Pferde…’; Matthias Bauer ‘Manufacturing Discontent: The Rise to Power of 
Anti-TTIP Groups,’ European Center for International Political Economy, Occasional Paper 
02/2016 (2016); interview, Berlin, June 2016. 
29 Interview, Berlin, June, 2016. 
30 Cf. Bauer, 2016, ‘Pferde…’; Bauer ‘Manufacturing Discontent…’ Excluding the 31 pan-
European organizations, the countries with the most vocal national groups are Germany (114), 
UK (25), and Austria and France (each 15). The most influential individuals on TTIP in 
Germany (where 2015-2016 saw an average of 1-2 TTIP related events per day across the 
country), are from the SDP and the Greens and Die Linke  (Bauer, 2016, ‘Pferde...’:19-23), and 
left-leaning parties across the continent oppose TTIP, with many having well-anchored roots in 
the CSO community. For example, the German Left Party’s spokesperson on TTIP Michael Efler 
is also CEO of More Democracy, an anti-trade group, and was co-founder of the ‘Stop TTIP’ 
initiative. 
31 Interview, CSO representative, Brussels, May 2016. As one representative noted, ‘we 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
32 Cf. BEUC, 2014. Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues had previous public exposure dating 
back to the 1997 EU ban on diluted chlorine washes for poultry and the 1998 World Trade 
Organization (WTO) row over the compatibility of EU SPS regulations with WTO rules, cf. Isis 
Sien, ‘Beefing up the Hormones Dispute: Problems in Compliance and Viable Compromise 
Alternatives,’ The Georgetown Law Review 95, no.2 (2007):566-590. The longstanding debate 
over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in Europe, where GMOs are widely opposed, and 
the 2016 EU Directive on GMOs (widely considered unworkable), have also helped keep food 
safety in the public realm.  
33 Marsha Echols, ’Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United States: 
Different Cultures, Different Laws, Columbia Journal of European Law, 4, no. 2 (1998). 
Eurobarometer 389, 2012 
34 Eurobarometer 354, 2010. 
35 BEUC, 2014:3-4.  
36 Eurobarometer 354, 2010. 
37 Eurobarometer 419, 2014. 
38 ‘Evidence-based Union? A new alliance for science advice in Europe,’ The Guardian June 23, 
2013; ‘Madness’ of opposition to GM crops says Glover,’ The Scotsman, October 20, 2013; 
‘Juncker Science The European Commission’s chief scientific adviser falls afoul of the green 
lobby.’ Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2014.  
39 ‘Support in Principle for U.S.-EU Trade Pact, But Some Americans and Germans Wary of 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/09/support-in-principle-for-u-s-eu-trade-pact/; Friends of the 
Earth Europe, 2013. These attacks include verbal accusations against American negotiators 
stakeholder meetings as witnessed by one of the authors in Brussels, February 4, 2015, where the 
US was accused by a prominent CSO of ‘lacking any standards whatsoever.’ 
40 Hans von der Burchard, ‘The Man who Killed TTIP,’ Politico, July 14, 2016, p. 10 
41 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Recent Developments in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement,’ New York and Geneva, 2014, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf; cf. Susan Franck, ‘Investor 
State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check’ presentation at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, October 31, 2014; Susan Frank, ‘Using Investor-State 
Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict Management: An Introductory Guide’, Washington and 
Lee Public Legal Studies Research Paper Series 2014-13 (2014). 
42 Interview, union representative, Brussels, May 2016. Jan Kleinheisterkamp. Jan (2014), ‘Is 
there a Need for Investor-State Arbitration in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP)?’ London: LSE Working Papers 10 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2410188; 
Marrti Koskenniemi, ’Investor Protection in TTIP: fading democracy or new generation?’ 
presentation at the London School of Economics, February 18, 2014.  
43 Bauer in Flamant, 2015.  
44 Bauer in Flamant, 2015.  
45 E.g. BEUC, Corporate Observatory Europe. 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
47 Cf. ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2015’ Reuters Institute  for the Study of Journalism, 
United Kingdom: Oxford (2015), 
http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Supplementary%20Digital%20News%2
0Report%202015.pdf; ’Europeans Face the World Divided’ Pew Global Attitudes Survey, June 
13 (2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-face-the-world-divided/ 
48European Commission, ‘Issues paper Communicating on TTIP – Areas for cooperation 
between the Commission services and Member States’. Brussels: European Commission, 
November7 (2013), http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2013/11/leaked-european-commission-pr-
strategy-communicating-ttip 
49 See STOPTTIP!’s website listing, https://stop-ttip.org/supporting-organisations/ 
50 E.g. Kleinheisterkamp, 2014. 
51 Public Citizen, TACD, Green MePs have frequently cited Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal 
Republic of Germany ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 and Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The 
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, as examples, though the 
latter case was dismissed in December 2015. Investments, GMOs and chlorine chickens were 
three out the five issues most covered by the media in 201. Matthias Bauer, ‘The Spiral of 
Silence – How Anti-TTIP Groups Dominate German Online Media and Set the Tone for TTIP 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
52 E.g. Corporate Observatory, ‘ISDS: Spreading the disease instead of looking for a cure’ May 6 
(2015), http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2015/05/isds-spreading-disease-instead-
looking-cure. 
53 Natacha Cingotti, Pia Eberhardt, Nelly Grotefendt, Cecilia Olivet and Scott Sinclair, 
‘Investment Court System put to the test New EU proposal will perpetuate investors’ attacks on 
health and environment’, April (2016), 
https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/icstest_web.pdf 
54 ‘EU Commission releases draft ISDS Proposal, Calling for Investment Court’ and ‘U.S. 
Chamber, ISDS Critics Blast EU Investment Proposals; Parliament Praises’ Inside US Trade, 
September 18, 2015.  
55 Bauer, 2016, ‘Pferde…’ 
56 Bauer, 2016, ‘Pferde…’ 
57 Matthias Bauer in Albane Flamant, ‘TTIP: Lobby or not Lobby?’ April (2015), 
https://albaneflamant.atavist.com/ttiplobbying 
58 There were other observable developments resulting from interest group access. The erection 
of a TTIP advisory group in February 2014, the implementation of stakeholder presentations and 
debriefings during the week-long negotiation rounds beginning with the fourth round (held 
February 2014). While negotiators publicly state they learned much from these exercises, 
stakeholders were disappointed ‘while a good idea and [we were] initially enthusiastic we 
realized little came from it’, and business organizations largely ceased attending after six rounds, 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
59 Graphs available online at  EDITOR FILL IN DOI ADDRESS and from authors.  
60 While in general more searches tended to be conducted in Germany than in any other of the 
selected member states, the tendency in all six cases was toward an increase in searches during 
this period. Graphs available upon request, but they closely track Google searches.  
61Author searches in October and November 2016. 
62 Graphs available online at  EDITOR FILL IN DOI ADDRESS and from authors.  
63 ‘Paris and Berlin call for review of E-Canada trade deal’, Euractiv January 27, 2015, 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/paris-and-berlin-call-for-review-of-eu-
canada-trade-deal/ 
64 National parliaments, and six regional Belgian parliaments, had to approve CETA after the 
Commission decided for political reasons (CSO protests and growing public opposition) to 
propose ratification as a ‘mixed agreement’ (shared EU and national competencies). 
65 DeVille and Siles-Bürgge, 2015; Christian Oliver and Anca Gurzu, ‘EU and Canada win a 
trade battle — but not the war,’ Politico.eu, October 30, 2016, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-and-canada-win-a-trade-battle-but-not-the-war. 
66 Eurobarometer 85 (2016). 
67‘Open letter to the European Commission EU-US Trade negotiators,’ Friends of the Earth 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
68 Anthony Faiola, ‘Free trade with U.S.? Europe balks at chlorine chicken, hormone beef.’ 
Washington Post, December 4, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/free-trade-
with-us-europe-balks-at-chlorine-chicken-hormone-beef/2014/12/04/e9aa131c-6c3f-11e4-bafd-
6598192a448d_story.html 
cf. Friends of the Earth, 2014 
69 Pew, 2014. 
70 E.g. ‘TTIP and the NHS: Don’t be Fooled by New BBC Leak’ War on Want, February 27 
(2015), http://www.waronwant.org/media/ttip-and-nhs-dont-be-fooled-new-bbc-leak  
71 YouGov/38 Degrees, Survey, August 2014, 
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/umt71i8wcn/38degrees_resul
ts_140826_TTIP_W(new%20tabs).pdf 
72 YouGov , Survey, March, 2015, 
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/8h6hq2m8mr/March_Eurotra
ck_Website.pdf 
73 Eurobarometer 82 (2014), 83 (2015); 83 (2016); cf. Bauer, 2015; Leif Johan Eliasson, ‘The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Interest Groups, Public Opinion, and Policy’ in 
Patricia Garcia-Duran and Montserrat Millet, eds., Different Glances at EU Trade Policy, 
Barcelona: Barcelona Center for International Affairs, (2016):33-45. 
74 The exchanges between MEPs in EPP, who approved of the resolution and were eager to vote, 
and the Socialist and Social Democratic group, were intense, even harsh, right up to the 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
75 Some research indicates that the receptivity to campaigns about how TTIP threatens food and 
public services (among other issues) is likely enhanced because of increased skepticism towards 
globalization and neoliberalism generally, as well as skepticism of America. One scholar found 
that especially people who reject the globalization process and oppose the EU also oppose TTIP. 
See Nils Steiner (2016) ‘Public Support for TTIP in EU Countries: The Correlates of Trade 
Policy Preferences in a Salient Case’ January 20, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2718984 
The problem with these findings is that support for the EU has remained steady as support for 
TTIP has fallen. Since support for trade generally has also remained high, Stein’s study lends 
support for our research showing that framing by anti-TTIP campaigns is effective.  
